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This paper studies the role of uncertainty in the corporate cash hoarding puzzle.
The baseline model is a stochastic neoclassical growth model featuring idiosyncratic
and uninsurable productivity shocks and a cash-in-advance constraint on new in-
vestments on the individual firm level. Individual agents’ choices regarding cash
holdings are analyzed. After a wealth threshold is reached, the cash-in-advance con-
straint ceases to have an effect on the agent’s behavior. The resulting aggregate
cash holdings of households increases with uncertainty. Aggregate consumption is
also higher, but the added volatility of consumption decreases lifetime utility. Al-
lowing firms to borrow and lend available unused cash increases average variables.
An exogenous increase in the interest rate at which they intermediate funds leads to
increased intermediation activity, corresponding to the lending channel of monetary
policy transmission.
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1 Introduction
Figure 1: Ratio of Cash to Net Assets. Source: Sachnez and Yurdugal, 2012.
The ratio of cash and short term investments to total assets of publicly traded non-
financial non-utility US corporations has on average increased from less than 6% in 1990
to more than 12% in 2011 (Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009), see Figure 1. There are
many reasons for this, ranging from tax reasons to precautionary savings (Sanchez and
Yurdugal, 2012). The precautionary motive gains additional weight when considering
the answers to a survey of Chief Financial Officers of corporations globally, who state
cash flow shortfalls and uncertainty about future investment opportunities among the
most relevant reasons for excess cash holdings (Lins, Servaes and Tufano, 2010). In the
same survey, the CFOs report that internal cash balances can be cheaper than accessing
outside sources of funds. Furthermore, McVanel and Perevalov (2008) find a steady
rise in the cash flow variability of Canadian firms from the 1980s to the mid-2000s,
a development that tracks the rise of excess cash on company balance sheets. These
findings indicate that uncertain environments may be partly responsible for increases in
cash hoarding.
Although firms are commonly modeled as maximizing their expected lifetime profits
by choosing the input factors of production optimally (see, for example, Woodford,
2002), these investments are often not constrained by any liquidity considerations of
the firm, which implies perfect trust in the future settlement of suppliers’ advance. In
reality, however, firms carefully manage their cash holdings (and capital structure) to
insure adequate cash holdings at every point: liquidity holdings below a certain level
will prevent firms from meeting ongoing expenses and, possibly worse, prohibit profitable
investments from being undertaken (unless the firm engages in restrictively expensive
last minute lines of credit). Too high a cash balance is problematic in its own terms,
since the funds could be either spent more profitably by investing in assets necessary for
generating future revenue or paid out as dividends to the owners of the firm.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Financial Assets, NCNF Companies. Source: US Flow of
Funds, 2014.
of profitability with her responsiveness to productivity shocks. The circumstance of a
prohibitive minimum cash balance is modeled as a Clower, or cash-in-advance (CIA),
constraint. The constraining variable is chosen in the preceding period and this estab-
lishes an upper bound for certain expenses, which may be binding, depending on the
current choice of those expenses. Establishing a value for this upper bound, which is
decided endogenously, is simple in the case of certainty, because it merely has to cover
predetermined expenses. In the case of uncertainty, however, the optimal upper bound
depends on the expectations of expenses, which depend on the realization of the pro-
ductivity shock. There is no insurance mechanism apart from self insurance through
increased wealth holdings. The non-linear nature of the CIA constraint rules out pertur-
bation techniques. Also, since there is only one law of motion for two state variables, I
need to define a grid of possible values for one of those state variables to find a solution.
This analysis therefore uses value function iteration to solve the model. I receive a policy
function for cash holdings that varies with the amount of uncertainty, increasing excess
holdings in more risky environments. In addition, I study the effects of one firm lend-
ing available cash to another firm, and the change that an interest rate increase brings
about.
Cash hoarding is not a problem per se, since cash and short term investments are
usually held by financial intermediaries, who will channel the funds to other likely prof-
itable ventures. Non-corporate non-financial US companies keep their financial assets
partly in banks and partly in non-banks, like money market mutual funds, see Figure
3
Figure 3: Response to Lending by Banks and Money Market Mutual Funds after a 1%
increase in the Federal Funds Rate. Source: Igan et al, 2013.
2. This allocation of funds increases the interconnectivity between the real and finan-
cial sector, however, and may propagate financial risk to the real economy (Gertler and
Kiyotaki, 2010). In addition, since monetary policy affects the real economy through
the financial sector, different degrees of connectivity may have varying effects on the
real economy. Bank lending and money market mutual fund lending react in different
directions following an increase in the monetary policy rate, see Figure 3.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 the individual agent’s problem is
presented. The steady state and dynamics are discussed. Section 3 explains the choice
of parameters and explains some computational issues. Section 4 presents the global
policy functions and aggregates individual decisions to a full distribution of agents. The
effects of the CIA constraint and the effects of idiosyncratic risk on aggregate variables
are decomposed, giving rise to two different kinds of precautionary savings. A financial
sector is introduced in Section 5 that intermediates between cash rich and cash poor
households. In a simulation, we show how exogenous interest rate increases can lead to
an increase in the funds channeled through the intermediary. The last section concludes.
2 The Individual Agent’s Problem
In order to study the role of uncertainty on corporate cash balance sheets, we will build a
model of a household that operates a firm. The household behaves like the manager of a
firm who needs to invest into capital for the production process to produce consumption
goods, which provide her with utility. In order to invest into the production process,
she needs to hold a liquid balance to finance the capital expenditure. The connection
with the real world is that companies have to continually pay dividends (consumption
in this model) that they receive though their production processes. Investing into the
production process takes time, which is why capital only becomes productive with a one
period lag. Physical capital depreciates and has to be replaced. The replacement is done
through investment, which is costly. The investment can ideally be financed through
equity or debt issuance. However, profitable investment opportunities often fade quickly
and changes to the capital structure can take a long time and are costly (see Bates,
Kahlte and Stulz, 2009). Once the capital is in place, the productivity of the production
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process can vary. Depending on the realization of productivity, the household is left with
more or less resources for either consumption or further investment. The uncertainty
about the production process therefore drives the cash balance of the firm.
2.1 The infinitely lived household
Consider an infinitely lived household that maximizes discounted utility, which is strictly







The household’s behavior is subject to a budget constraint and a CIA constraint:
ct + kt +Dt = Atf(kt−1) + (1− δ)kt−1 +Dt−1 {λt} (2)
kt ≤ Dt−1 + (1− δ)kt−1 {µt} (3)
At = stochastic process (4)
where c is consumption, k is the capital stock, D is deposits at a bank which we will
treat as equivalent to cash, A is the level of technology, f is the production function, δ
is the depreciation rate on capital.
The household can either consume or choose to invest into capital or deposit holdings.
By investing into capital, the household receives a return from production as well as
undepreciated capital the following period. In addition, at the end of the current period
the agent can carry over any wealth into the next period by depositing it at a bank at no
interest. A CIA constraint motivates the agent to do this: Every period, the maxmimal
amount of investments into capital can not exceed the amount of deposit holdings at
the bank. The intuition for this is that the household needs a basket of different goods
for investment that it does not itself produce. This basket contains goods that may not
necessarily be traded for the household’s own produce this period, but instead can be
bought using a liquid asset in the form of bank deposits. The household can always sell
all of its produce on the market and receive deposits in return. Note that deposits are
a real good, which can also be consumed in case it is not used for investment purposes.
Technology A underlies a stochastic process. The revenue generated from production
can therefore not be determined in advance. There are two interpretations for this. In
the case of a persistent shock process, technology can be taken as profitable investments.
This corresponds to an acquisition of one business by another. However, as in Hopenhayn
and Rogerson (1993), this can also be interpreted as a consumer taste shock that shifts
the demand curve. This is also true in case of no persistence.
Letting λ, µ be the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers on the constraints, the resulting First-
order conditions for consumption, capital and deposits are, respectively 1,
1The Lagrangian is
L =u(ct)− λt[ct + kt − (1− δ)kt−1 +Dt −Atf(kt−1)−Dt−1]− µt[kt − (1− δ)kt−1 −Dt−1]
+β{u(ct+1)− λt+1[ct+1 + kt+1 − (1− δ)kt +Dt+1 −At+1f(kt)−Dt]− µt+1[kt+1 − (1− δ)kt −Dt]}
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U ′(ct) = λt (5)
λt + µt = βEt{λt+1[At+1f ′(kt) + 1− δ] + µt+1(1− δ)} (6)
λt = βEt{λt+1 + µt+1}. (7)
[Dt−1 − kt + (1− δ)kt−1]µt = 0, Dt−1 − kt + (1− δ)kt−1 ≥ 0, µt ≥ 0 (8)
Equation 5 states that the marginal utility of consumption equals the marginal utility
of wealth λt. Equation 7 states that capital should be invested up until the combined
cost of having an additional unit of wealth λt and at the same time an additional unit of
liquidity bearing assets µt, which is made up of deposits and undepreciated capital from
the previous period, has to be equal to the combined value of the marginal capital return,
which is the marginal product from production including next-period’s undepreciated
capital, weighted by tomorrow’s marginal utility plus the future liquidity services the
undepreciated future capital will deliver. Equation 7 states that the cost of investing a
unit of wealth into deposits today has to equal the value of having that additional unit
deliver wealth or liquidity services tomorrow.
2.2 The Deterministic Steady State
In the deterministic steady state, the stochastic process regarding technolgy is turned








+ δ − 1)
c = f(k)− δk
D = δk.
Compared to the neoclassical growth model without a CIA constraint, the marginal
product of capital is higher by 1β , because the additional liquidity services from cash
are costly and have to be financed one period in advance as can be seen in the three
period model, where production in period 3 depended on the choice of deposit holdings
in period 1.
The CIA constraint is binding, since the first order condition with respect to deposits
(7) would otherwise lead to a contradiction: a non-binding CIA constraint implies µ = 0,
which results in β = 1. This means that the household holds a deposit balance equal to
the replacement investment each period due to depreciation. Since the marginal product
of capital dominates the marginal product of cash, which does not carry any interest,
additional deposit holdings are never profitable. A smaller deposit balance would prevent
the household from maintaining its steady state capital level.
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2.3 Dynamics in the Infinite Time Model
Adding stochastics changes the rational regarding asset holdings. The optimal asset
level rises with uncertainty. Assets in the model are comprised of capital and deposits.
Interpolating from the two period to the infinite period optimization, the amount of
capital holdings increases with risk.
Additionally, the CIA constraint introduces a further motive for precautionary sav-
ings as not to hit the liquidity constraint. The household will always prefer to invest into
capital, as long as the marginal productivity of capital is above the marginal productivity
of deposits, which does not carry any interest and is always 0. However, a positive shock
may induce the household to save more deposits as to realize higher capital investments
in the following period. Optimal deposit holdings depend on the exact nature of the
shock.
The additional CIA constraint changes the household’s precautionary savings motive.
Not only does self-insurance against adverse shocks play a role. In addition, hitting the
CIA constraint is costly in utility terms as well. The household may have an incentive
to insure against hitting the liquidity constraint, too.
When no uncertainty is present and the inequality constraint in the model descrip-
tion always binds we can determine deposit holdings each period exactly from the first
order condition for next period’s optimal capital, which together with our current pe-
riod capital gives us our deposit holdings exactly. When we do not know whether the
inequality constraint is binding or not, because next period’s optimal capital can not yet
be determined, since the shock has not realized, finding the optimal value for deposit
holdings has to be done numerically.
3 Model Specification, Parametrization, and Computation
In this section, we will specify the model further and choose parameter values for solving
the model. The computational method and the kind of aggregation is discussed.
Household utility is of isoelastic utility form U(ct) =
c1−γt
1−γ with a coefficient of relative
risk aversion γ. The production function is assumed to be concave, i.e. f(k) = kα
and specified by output elasticity α. The stochastic process in this model is At =
ĀeρlogAt−1+εt , where Ā is the steady state value of technology and ε is an idiosyncratic
shock to technology that follows a white noise process, ε ∼ N(0, σ2).
The parameter values are mostly taken from Aiyagari (1994), who specifies the model
period as one year. The utility discount factor β is 0.96. The output elasticity α equals
0.36. Depreciation δ is 0.08. As a coefficient of relative risk aversion γ, I choose 3 out
of the ones offered by Aiyagari.
For the shock process, I am choosing no autocorrelation for computational reasons,
explained further below. Choosing a standard deviation for the shock process is tricky.
In the literature, there are various explanations for standard deviations for idiosyncratic
shocks to labor and for aggregate technology shocks. It is harder to find a meaningful
parameter for idiosyncratic shocks to a firm’s technology in a simple framework like
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this. Pesaran and Xu (2011) estimate a σ = .041 and Covas (2005) chooses σ = 0.4,
which is in line with McVanel and Perevalov (2008) when fluctuations in technology are
interpreted as variations in cash flow. Covas has a similarly basic model with a borrowing
constraint albeit without a CIA constraint. He performs a sensitivity analysis by varying
the standard deviation and persistence and finds a sizeable difference between aggregate
capital in a model with uninsurable productivity risk and complete markets depending
on the parametrization. With a CIA constraint in place, this effect is likely to vary since
not only is there a borrowing constraint in place but an additional constraint on another
dimension. I choose σ = 0.4 and will perform a sensitivity analysis below.
Computation
The computational method is a value function iteration that was performed using
Matlab. The algorithm is standard and I only highlight some parameter values and one
divergence from my own model.
Although the model is specified in terms of capital and deposits, both variables play
the role of savings devices. Instead of evaluating the model at absolute values of these
variables, I have rewritten the model such that the first variable is combined wealth,
equal to capital and deposits, and the second variable is the percentage of wealth that
is held in deposits.




This is done for computational reasons: In VFI it is a problem when the derived
policy functions hit the grid boundaries since I can not be sure whether the agent would
have preferred a value outside the grid. The grid is usually chosen in such a way that
most of the dynamics take place towards the middle. When choosing absolute values
for both variables, the method evaluates extreme areas as well: those with low and high
values for both variables at the grid end points. Since an agent with a high level of
combined capital and deposits would choose a very high capital value that is not within
the grid bounds, this may distort the policy functions, although an agent would never
visit these areas given a steady state and a stochastic process. Including this higher
capital value on a successive larger grid exaggerates the problem, since the reaction to
this grid point including deposits is yet higher. For absolute values there is no upper
bound. Instead, the absolute variable wealth can be distributed optimally by a relative
variable that is bound between 0% and 100% and if these grid end point are reached,
they are a naturally occurring extreme.
The shock process is modeled using Tauchen’s (1986) method.
Aggregation
The economy is populated with a continuum of households all of the type discussed



















Importantly, aggregate production consist of adding all the individual production
functions, instead of assuming aggregate capital as the input in the production function.
To compute the stationary distribution, we follow the approach by Maussner and
Heer (2005) using a Monte Carlo simulation. Every period, the household’s technology
is hit with a shock and the household reacts to it depending on its state. Since the grids
are discrete, eventually all possible state combinations are visited by the agent. Equiva-
lently, we can look at a distribution of agents, starting with the total mass concentrated
on one state, and look at the reaction to each possible shock. Since the shock realiza-
tions are on a discrete grid, the first such reaction will be control vectors for wealth and
deposit percentage of a size equal to or less than the number of shock realizations. Each
of these control vectors can be regarded as possible states in the following period and
again hit with all possible realizations of the shock. Since all grids are discretized, the
maximal combination of states and shocks is the number of grid points of both state vari-
ables multiplied with each other and with the number of realizations of the idiosyncratic
shock. Eventually, if further shocks only change individual agents’ reaction but not the
distribution across state combinations, we arrive at a stationary distribution. Fortu-
nately, this is the case for this model2. This stationary distribution from idiosyncratic
shocks can then be analyzed in comparison to the complete markets case.
Since the grids in this model are discretized, I am receiving a stationary distribution
that has mass concentrated on specific state combinations. Since the discretization is
only a computational tool to solve the policy functions and the policy functions would
themselves be continuous, I will present the resulting stationary distribution after fitting
a probability distribution to the data. I am using the MATLAB command fitdist with
a normal kernel smoother along both dimensions and a window size of 1 for th wealth
dimension and a window size of 0.05 for deposit percentage.
Aggregation for comparing the results is done using the discretized results. Since
the distribution is stationary, I simply aggregate the state variables capital and deposits
with regard to their mass. For consumption the realization of the shock matters. I
therefore aggregate over their mass conditional on the shock they receive.
2I have yet to prove whether this is the case in general and for which parameter space
9
shock shock
state variable wealth state variable wealth
Deposits Deposits

















It is important to note that every agent produces using their own capital holdings as
input for the production function. Therefore each agent will have a different marginal




The household reacts to the current technology shock εt and state variables xt−1 and
dt−1 by choosing current consumption ct, current wealth xt and percentage invested
in deposits dt. Although all policy functions are highly non-linear, the key result is
the difference in the policy function for deposits in the case of a constrained vs an
unconstrained agent.
For wealthy firms, the value of additional consumption and additional production




Figure 5: Stationary distribution over states wealth and deposit percentage
the behavior of a constrained wealthy firm is identical to the behavior of an unconstrained
wealthy firm. Wealthy firms are those that own state variable wealth of more than 12.
Once wealth exceeds a boundary, the CIA constraint does not play any role anymore. In
both cases, investments into deposits increase with the size of the shock and the amount
of wealth.
Wealthy firms value the certain return of cash over the uncertain but possibly higher
return of additional production. For less wealthy firms, the policy function for deposits
increases mostly in the size of the shock: higher available resources lead to additional
investments into deposits because the firm insures against hitting the CIA constraint.
This is clearly not a motivation in the unconstrained case: all available resources will
be either consumed or invested into production, because the marginal product of capital
exceeds the marginal product of deposits, and uncertain returns are more valuable than
uncertain ones.
4.2 Aggregation
The heterogeneous agent economy converges to a stationary distribution after some time.
As can be seen from figure 5 the distribution of agents is spread across the wealth and
deposit percentage dimensions. Two things stand out. First, the distribution is bound
by zero deposit holdings to the north west of the figure. Since agents can not borrow,
the distribution can not spread out across the zero threshold. Without a borrowing
constraint we might be able to see the distribution extend across the threshold.
This is a problem for many households at the zero deposit threshold because zero
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deposit holdings mean that they can not make any net new capital expenditures beyond
their undepreciated capital. Even if a favorable shock occurs, they will need to allocate
the additional return from production to deposits first and can only invest into capital
the following period. The difference between the possible marginal return on capital and
the marginal return on deposits is a loss to the household that can not be regained.
At the same time, there are many agents that do not need all their deposit holdings,
because their realized investment is smaller. By investing into deposits they are insuring
against the case that they are going to be constrained by the CIA constraint and lose the
difference between marginal productivity of capital and deposits themselves. All agents
could therefore benefit by allocating some of the deposits of the deposit-rich agents to
the deposit-poor agents that would like to invest. The additional marginal productivity
could be split in some way that makes all agents better off. Such a financial intermediary
does not exist in this model.
The second observation is the distribution of agents that is continually hit with
positive shocks and therefore keeps accumulating wealth. It is visible in figure 5 as the
mass branching off from the probability distribution to the north east. Wealth holdings
increase and the agents allocate more of their wealth into deposits. These are the agents
that are holding wealth higher than 12 in this model. Their value from liquidity services is
greater than their marginal productivity of additional capital or the additional marginal
utility from consumption, and this value increases quickly, inducing ever higher deposit
holdings.
This fact can be observed well in figure 6, a Lorenz curve for deposit holdings.
The distribution of deposit holdings is distributed very unequally across the population.
A financial intermediary could allocate this liquidity from deposit-rich to deposit-poor
households to meet the CIA constraint.
4.3 Decomposition into Liquidity and Risk Motives
We have introduced two mechanisms into the model that cause precautionary savings
of two different types. One is the well known precautionary motive for wealth holdings
to insure against idiosyncratic risk. The other one is precautionary savings against
hitting the liquidity constraint and not being able to invest optimally into capital. I
will call these two different precautionary motives PS1 and PS2 after Xu (1995) who
studied precautionary savings in the income fluctuation problem from idiosyncratic risk
and a borrowing constraint. By solving a model with and without CIA constraint (but
borrowing constraints) I can compare the values of the aggregate economy with their
steady state counterparts. Precautionary savings are then defined as:
PS1 = wealthnoCIA − wealthSS
PS2 = wealthCIA − wealthnoCIA
Table 1 compares aggregate values from the stationary distribution with their steady
state counterparts in a model of idiosyncratic risk but no CIA constraint. Agents insure
12























Lorenz curve for deposits
Figure 6: Lorenz curve for deposits
Consumption Capital Deposits Wealth
Steady State 1.39 5.11 0 5.11
Idiosyncratic Risk 3.2 14.16 0.21 14.37
Deviation 230% 277% NA 281%
Table 1: Comparison between steady state and aggregate values without CIA constraint
mostly by accumulating more capital up until the point at which the marginal produc-
tivity of capital becomes less than the marginal productivity of deposits. This is indeed
the case in this model under our current parameterization. The aggregate values for the
economy deviate significantly from their steady state values. This deviation is obviously
related to the standard deviation of the shock.
Table 2 compares steady state values of a model with idiosyncratic risk and a CIA
constraint with their aggregate realization. The difference in the steady states is only in
deposits, since the agent in the CIA constraint model needs deposits each period that
cover the investment expenses for depreciated capital. The aggregate realizations are
even higher, which is unsurprising given that the households have to insure along two
dimensions. Especially of interest is the fact that firms hoard enormous amounts of
the liquid asset without even planning on spending it. One motive is the uncertainty
about investment opportunities. Secondly, however, since uncertainty already increases
their capital holdings, firms’ marginal productivity of capital is further reduced. This
reduction brings the low marginal productivity of deposits less unattractive. The result
is a further investment into these assets. Excess cash hoarding is the result.
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Consumption Capital Deposits Wealth
Steady State 1.39 5.11 0.41 5.52
CIA constraint 6.36 26.76 2.79 29.55
Deviation 458% 524% 680% 535%
Table 2: Comparison between steady state and aggregate values with CIA constraint
CRRA Consumption Capital Deposits Wealth
Steady State 1.39 5.11 0.41 5.52
0.5 1.57 5.91 0.55 6.46
1 1.57 6.04 0.58 6.62
2 3.16 12.7 1.26 13.95
3 6.36 26.76 2.79 29.55
Table 3: Comparison of aggregate values with CIA constraint for different values of γ
Curiously, aggregate consumption is higher in both models than in the steady state.
This may be surprising, since the agents only value consumption in utility and a higher
aggregate level in a stationary distribution would mean that risk and even a constraint
increase utility. This is only true of the aggregate level, however. In time, agents in
both models visit all of the different levels of consumption eventually. This fluctuation
in consumption is costly: Utility of an (aggregate) agent living in the steady state, the
idiosyncratic but unconstrained model, and the CIA constrained model are, respectively
-0.26, -0.42 and -0.85. Agents would therefore always prefer the steady state to the
idiosyncratic and to the constrained model.
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to study how sensitive the model results are to parameter values, I am showing
key results from different parameterizations. Most of the parameters are directly taken
from Aiyagari (1994). However, no counter part from that paper exists for a technology
shock. In addition, the economic interpretation of this shock process can differ. I
therefore present aggregate variables of the economy for different values of the standard
deviation as shown in Figure 7.
In addition, since this study is concerned with precautionary savings, a variation of
the coefficient of relative risk aversion is in order. Table 3 shows values for aggregate
variables of the economy for different values of the coefficients of relative risk aversion.
The higher the coefficient of relative risk aversion the more negatively a household is
affected by changing consumption. Because volatility in consumption is bad, a household
will self insure against negative consumption outcomes by having a higher consumption
level in expectations.
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Figure 7: Deviation of deposits from steady state value for different standard deviation
of the shock
5 Introducing a Financial Sector
As explained above, households need liquid assets to finance investments. These liquid
assets take the form of deposits, which are simply created by an exogenously assumed
financial sector. This sector holds the liquid assets for the households and trades them for
investments when so demanded. In reality, the banks are themselves economic entities
that maximize profits by finding profitable investment opportunities. Investment for
them takes the form of loans into businesses that are cash constrained. This model
features many agents that are cash constrained, namely those whose CIA constraint is
binding. We will now discuss whether and how the financial sector can distribute funds
from households with available funds to households with demand for available funds,
and how he interest rate affects lending.
For this experiment we need to allow the household to borrow and lend funds. The
household’s budget constraint and CIA constraint are modified accordingly:
ct + kt +Dt = Atf(kt−1) + (1− δ)kt−1 +Dt−1 + rtFt (9)
kt ≤ Dt−1 + (1− δ)kt−1 − Ft. (10)
(11)
The household has the possibility to lend out funds Ft at the exogenously given
interest rate rt, which increases the available resources (the right hand side of the bud-
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get constraint) to invest into consumption, capital and deposits. The downside is that
the CIA constraint becomes tighter. Depending on the amount of available funds, the
household may prefer to lend or even borrow: negative values of funds Ft signify bor-
rowing, which decreases the amount of available resources this period but softens the
CIA constraint, thereby allowing more investment into capital. This makes sense if the
cost of borrowing is less than the expected discounted additional marginal product of
capital next period. Conditional on intermediation, the agent may pick investments in
capital and deposits as well as consumption that are different from the case without
intermediation.
We next assume that the only available funds for borrowing have to come from a
household that wants to lend. We thus assume two firms that can borrow and lend
from each other and that receive a certain value V (Ft, rt) from intermediating funds Ft
at interest rate rt. In order for intermediation to take place, both firms have to prefer
intermediation V j(Ft, rt) and V
−j(−Ft, rt) to no intermediation V j(0, .) and V −j(0, .) .
To verify this, we solve the value function iteration with two additional state variables,
funds Ft and interest rate rt, within certain bounds. For every combination of states,
the VFI will evaluate all combinations of funds and interest rates. The resulting value
function will indicate which funds/interest rate combinations are most valuable to the
agent for each state. If one agent prefers to lend out funds at a given interest rate to not
lending out any funds, and the other agent prefers borrowing that amount of funds at
that interest rate to borrowing no funds, we have established a suitable intermediation
match.
Often, there are several combinations of funds/interest rates that are preferable to
both agents compared to the status quo of no lending. There are several ways of es-
tablishing which combination is selected. Apart from a random choice we can consider
the maximum aggregate value of both agents’ combinations, or the maximum value for
either borrower or lender. The algorithm for selecting a fund/interest rate combination
is then as follows.
Algorithm for intermediation each period
1. Draw a technology shock for each agent (correlated or uncorrelated).
2. Find values without intermediation for both agents V j(0, .) and V −j(0, .).
3. Find values for all possible fund/interest rate combinations V j(Ft, rt) and V
−j(−Ft, rt).
4. Evaluate which combinations are preferable to both agents V j(Ft, rt) > V
j(0, .) and
V −j(−Ft, rt) > V −j(0, .).
5. Pick combination based on a decision rule (random, lender/borrower/aggregate max-
imum).
6. If applicable, update choice for capital, deposits and consumption.
Depending on the decision rule, we receive different average values for our variables.
Table 4 summarizes the results. Once we allow intermediation, the average values are
not too different from each other. However, if we impose a different interest rate on
intermediation from the one that was selected by the decision rule, we see different
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Best Value Shocks Consumption Capital Deposits Funds Interest rate
No Intermediation 1.33 5.12 .57 0 -
Borrower
correlated 1.39 5.76 .63 .25 .02
uncorrelated 1.38 5.77 .62 .27 .02
Lender
correlated 1.40 5.86 .64 .25 .025
uncorrelated 1.4 5.98 .65 .27 .023
Aggregate
correlated 1.39 5.72 .63 .25 .02
uncorrelated 1.42 6.12 .66 .27 .02
Table 4: Simulation results: average values for different types of fund intermediation
Intermediation










Table 5: Simulation results: average values for different types of fund intermediation
results for the amounts of funds intermediated based on decision rule and correlation.
For this analysis, we need to change the algorithm for intermediation to test for
effects of exogenous interest rate increases. Specifically, after the algorithm has decided
on a combination based on decision rule and correlation, we impose a higher interest rate
and count the times that indermediation will go up, down, or stay unchanged. Table 5
shows the number of times that intermediateded funds increased and decreased following
an exogenous interest rate increase.
If the amount of intermediation is picked that delivers the highest value to the bor-
rower, an exogenous increase in the interest rate will often lead to higher values for funds
being intermediated. The intuition for this is clear: since we pick the optimal value for
the borrower, the lender may face an inoptimal fund/interest rate combination. If the
interest rate is increased despite the decision rule, the lender is induced to increase the
amount of funds made available. Even though this fund/interest rate combination is
suboptimal for the borrower (compared to her best value case), it is still better to bor-
row more at a higher interest rate and invest the additional funds into capital than to
borrow less. This stands in contrast to the case when the best value for the lender is
selected. An increase in the interest rate may induce the lender to make more funds
available. However, the lender already receives their best value and an increase of the
interest rate discourages the borrower from increasing demand for funds. The decision
rule for highest aggregate value is an intermediate case: increases in the interest rate
sometimes lead to more, sometimes to less intermediation.
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6 Preliminary Conclusion
Firms faced with idiosyncratic shocks regarding their cash flows that cannot be fully
insured against and that have to react to investment opportunities on the spot and
without outside financing amass liquid holdings well in excess of the amount they actually
are likely to spend in the next period.
Non wealthy firms invest into deposits in excess of their expected investment next
period because an additional unit in deposits tomorrow will enable an additional invest-
ment into capital tomorrow. This is valuable, if the twice discounted marginal return
on capital in two periods time is higher than the marginal return on capital tomorrow.
Wealthy firms invest into deposits because they value certain returns over risky
returns. Importantly, wealthy firms’ policy function for deposits is unaffected by a
CIA constraint. The liquidity motive does not play a role.
Two additional mechanisms that drive higher cash holdings are at work. Firms
increase their capital holdings because of their precautionary savings motive. This over-
investment into capital decreases average marginal productivity across the economy. Be-
cause the opportunity costs of deposits decline, the low marginal productivity of deposits
becomes more attractive. Additionally, higher precautionary capital levels make higher
replacement investments necessary. In order to finance these additional investments,
precautionary deposits have to be held in advance.
Aggregate consumption in the case of uncertainty is higher than in the complete
markets case. The reason for this is the high variability of productivity and the resulting
volatility of marginal productivity. This volatile consumption, which is higher in the
aggregate, is unfavorable to lifetime utility. Agents would prefer a less risky environment.
Households may benefit from redistributing deposits temporarily in order to allow
deposit-poor households to reap high marginal productivity. Introducing a financial
intermediary results in higher average values for consumption, capital and deposits. De-
pending on the decision rule, imposing higher interest rates exogenously has the effect of
increasing intermediated funds, because lenders are more willing to make them available.
The increase in aggregate variables, partly attributable to the choice of parameter
values, has effects on the general equilibrium. Once endogenous interest rates and prices
are introduced, the absolute level of deposit holdings will influence these macro variables
and vice versa.
The high level of liquid assets, which is usually managed by the financial sector,
increases the connection between the real and the financial sector. Idiosyncratic firm
risk has a direct effect on funding opportunities for banks and other types of financial
intermediaries. Lending out hoarded cash can increase both borrower and lender utility.
18
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